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I. INTRODUCTION

An alleged patent infringer responding to a lawsuit involving a claim of
willful infringement-and most importantly, that claim's potential for treble
punitive damages'-will generally offer written evidence of the legal
opinion which was reasonably and in good faith relied upon in making,
using, or selling the device in dispute. As a result, this legal opinion, which

*Mr. Kuhne is counsel in the Dallas office of Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P.
1. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1982) (providing that in a patent infringement case tried to a jury, a trial
court may order that a judgment be entered in favor of a claimant for up to three times the
compensatory damages as determined by the court); see also Mathis v. Spears, 857 F.2d 749, 754
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating that "[p]rovisions for increased damages ... are available as deterrents to
blatant, blind, willful infringement of valid patents.").
2. See Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559,
1580 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (stating that "[i]t is well settled that a potential infringer having actual notice
of another's patent has an affirmative duty of due care that normally requires the potential infringer
to obtain competent legal advice before infringing or continuing to infringe."). Although reliance on
competent counsel is evidence of good faith, it is not conclusive. See Delta-X Corp. v. Baker
Hughes Prod. Tools, Inc., 984 F.2d 410,414 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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was previously privileged as an attorney-client communication, now
becomes relevant and admissible.3 The courts have held that many of the
underlying documents and conversations relating to such an opinion are
relevant, in that they are probative of the alleged infringer's intent,4 and are
admissible because the defendant has effectively waived the privilege.5 The
principle supporting such waiver is fundamental fairness - it is said that a
party should not be allowed to rely on a self-serving document in its defense
while withholding potentially damaging information under the guise of
privilege.6
One court has described the strategic posturing that the parties to these
cases typically take:
[T]he patent owner opens with a claim for willful infringement; the
alleged infringer answers by denying willful infringement and
asserts good faith reliance on advice of counsel as an affirmative
defense; then the owner serves contention interrogatories and
document requests seeking the factual basis for that good faith
reliance defense and the production of documents relating to
counsel's opinion; the alleged infringer responds by seeking to defer
responses and a decision on disclosure of the opinion; the owner
counters by moving to compel; and the alleged infringer moves to
stay discovery and for separate trials. 7
Clearly, the party claiming the advice-of-counsel defense has a simple
but difficult decision: claim the defense - or claim the privilege.
II.

SCOPE OF WAIVER

While the parties to a patent infringement case generally agree that
good-faith reliance on a legal opinion is relevant to rebutting a claim of
willful infringement and that assertion of the advice-of-counsel defense
operates as a waiver of the attorney-client privilege, the parties often

3. See Rolls-Royce Ltd. v. G.T.E. Valeron Corp., 800 F.2d 1101, 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
4. See Cordis Corp. v. SciMed Life Sys., Inc., 980 F. Supp. 1030, 1033 (D. Minn. 1997) (stating
that "a rigorous examination of the factual predicates for an opinion of patent counsel, in defense of
a claim of willfulness, is essential. To conclude otherwise, would be to effectively insulate the
potential infringer from increased damages.").
5. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 80 F.R.D. 718, 721 (N.D. I11.1978); see also Hercules
Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 156 (D. Del. 1977) (noting that voluntary waiver by the client
of one or more privileged documents waives the privilege as to all communications between the
attorney and the client).
6. See Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Coulter Corp., 118 F.R.D. 532, 533 (S.D.
Fla. 1987); see also Abbott Labs. v. Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc., 676 F. Supp. 831, 832 (N.D. Ill.
1987).
7. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Cellpro, 160 F.R.D. 30, 34 (D. Del. 1995).
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disagree about the scope of that waiver as it relates to work product. Most
courts have no trouble concluding that the attorney-client privilege is waived
as to communications between attorney and client concerning the legal
opinion relied upon.8 The more difficult issue relates to work product and
whether the defendant must produce all documents reviewed by, or prepared
for, legal counsel that were not communicated to the client. These include
so-called "opinion" or "mental impression" work product, such as attorney
notes, internal memoranda, and drafts of the opinion.9 The plaintiff seeking
such documents will invariably contend that the evidence sought is germane
to the competence of the legal opinion provided and to whether the
defendant's good-faith reliance on it was justified. At the extreme, a broad
waiver of the immunity would include virtually all documents, including
"opinion" work product.' 0 At the other end of the spectrum, a narrow scope
of waiver would extend only to those documents communicated between
counsel and client."
The jurisdiction to resolve appeals in patent actions is invested
exclusively in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.' 2
The Federal Circuit has held, as a matter of policy, that discovery in
procedural issues not unique to patent matters should be decided pursuant to
the law of the regional circuit where the district court sits. 13 However,
questions involving the scope of waiver of work-product immunity in patent
cases where willful infringement is an issue would appear to be unique to

8. See Hercules, 434 F. Supp. at 156.
9. This is particularly so in light of the restriction of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3),
which provides: "In ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made,
the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation." FED. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(3). The Supreme Court has declined to decide the issue of whether opinion work product can
be ordered to be disclosed. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 401-02 (1981); see also
Micron Separations, Inc. v. Pall Corp., 159 F.R.D. 361, 364 (D. Mass. 1995) (noting that none of the
appellate cases have dealt with an advice-of-counsel defense).
10. See, e.g., Mushroom Assocs. v. Monterey Mushrooms, Inc., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1767, 1770-71
(N.D. Cal. 1992).
11. See, e.g., Steelcase Inc. v. Haworth, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 1195, 1199-1200 (W.D. Mich. 1997)
(providing that advice-of-counsel waiver "does not extend to attorney work product or documents
upon which the attorney relied, unless they were somehow disclosed to [its clients]."); see also
Thorn EMI N. Am., Inc. v. Micron Tech., Inc., 837 F. Supp. 616, 622 (D. Del. 1993) (stating that
"[c]ounsel's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories are not probative of that
state of mind unless they have been communicated to that client.").
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1982).
13. See Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574-75 (Fed. Cir. 1984);
accordNike, Inc. v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 43 F.3d 644, 648 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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patent litigation. 14 Interestingly enough, there is no Federal Circuit authority
on this important question of the scope of work-product waiver relative to
the advice-of-counsel defense.' 5
The Federal Circuit has, nevertheless, made it clear that the relevant
inquiry is the infringer's intent, not that of counsel. 16 More significantly, the
Federal Circuit has held that importance of the legal opinion to the waiver
issue does not depend on its legal correctness.' 7 The question is whether
counsel's opinion was thorough enough, as combined with other factors, to
instill a belief in the alleged infringer that a court might reasonably hold the
patent to be invalid, not infringed, or unenforceable.' 8 Consequently, the
infringer's "intent and reasonable beliefs" are generally considered the
primary focus of a willful infringement inquiry. 19 With this in mind, the
scope to which otherwise privileged or immune materials must be produced
defense should be broad enough "to illuminate that
by the party asserting 2the
0
issue, but no broader.9
However, a number of cases, acknowledging that the infringer's state of
mind is the important matter, have held that it may be necessary to inquire
into the attorney's state of mind in order to better determine the infringer's
14. See Steelcase, 954 F. Supp. at 1197.
15. "[T]he Federal Circuit has been silent on the discovery issue of the extent of attorneyclient/work product waiver primarily because such discovery issues have not surfaced in post-trial
appeals to the knowledge of the parties or the undersigned." Chiron Corp. v. Genetech, 179 F. Supp.
2d 1182, 1186 (E.D. Cal. 2001).
16. See Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 944 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also Graco, Inc. v.
Binks Mfg. Co., 60 F.3d 785, 793 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The courts have identified a number of factors
that may be relevant to determining the alleged infringer's state of mind, including evidence that the
infringer copied the ideas or design, that the infringer had actual notice of the patent, and that the
infringer sought, obtained, and justifiably relied upon legal advice from counsel on whether or not
the patents were invalid or infringed. Thorn, 837 F. Supp. at 620.
17. See Ortho Pharm., 959 F.2d at 944; see also Graco, 60 F.3d at 793 (stating that "[w]hether or
not an opinion was 'legally' correct is not the proper focus.").
18. In determining whether or not an alleged infringer's reliance on an opinion of counsel was
reasonable, courts have looked at: when the infringer sought counsel's advice (before or after
commencing the infringing activities); the infringer's knowledge of the attorney's independence,
skill, and competence; the infringer's knowledge of the nature and extent of analysis performed by
counsel in providing the opinion; and whether the opinion contains sufficient internal indicia of
credibility, including a validity analysis predicated on a review of the file histories, and an
infringement analysis that compares and contrasts the potentially infringing method or apparatus
with the patented inventions. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 828-29 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see
also Ortho Pharm., 959 F.2d at 944; see also Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co.,
717 F.2d 1380, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
19. See Thorn, 837 F. Supp. at 620-22 (providing that "[t]he facts of consequence to the
determination of a claim of willful infringement relate to the infringer's state of mind. Counsel's
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories are not probative of that state of mind
unless they have been communicated to that client.").
20. See Steelcase, 954 F. Supp. at 1198; see also Kelsey-Hayes Co. v. Motor Wheel Corp., 155
F.R.D. 170, 172 (W.D. Mich. 1991); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Cellpro, 160 F.R.D. 30, 34 (D. Del.
1995) (providing that the attorney-client privilege is worthy of maximum legal protection and citing
cases to support this assertion).
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state of mind. 2' These courts have therefore required that the files of the
defendant's attorney, even those containing opinion work product, be
produced, usually under certain restrictions designed to prevent disclosure of
litigation strategy and the like. 2 The broad reach of Federal Rule of
Procedure 26(b)(1) 23 - allowing the court to order discovery of any relevant
matter - and Rule 26(b)(3)2 4 - allowing discovery of work product when
there is a showing of substantial need and the inability without undue
hardship to obtain substantially equivalent materials - is typically invoked to
justify this disclosure.
III. THE NARROW WAIVER POSITION
Courts advocating a narrow waiver of work product in willful
infringement cases typically reason that it is the mind of the allegedly
infringing party, not that of his attorney, which is at issue. In order to
explore the mind of the alleged infringer, it is necessary to know all the
information that reached that mind; however, information that did not do so
is irrelevant and therefore not discoverable. Under this line of reasoning,

21. See Dunhall Pharm., Inc. v. Discus Dental, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1202, 1205 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
The court in Dunhallfurther noted:
Additionally, focusing solely on whether evidence was clearly communicated by the
attorney to the client can obscure the fact that evidence which does not facially reflect
communication to the client may nonetheless be relevant to showing the client's state of
mind. This is so simply because negative evidence contained in the attorney's files raises
the reasonable circumstantial inference that the client was somehow appraised of the
negative opinions.
Id.
22. Id. at 1206. Further stating that:
Once the lawsuit is filed, the waiver of work product protection ends. This temporal
limitation follows from the enhanced interest in protecting against disclosure of trial
strategy and planning. Following the filing of the lawsuit, defense counsel is engaged in
critical trial preparation, often including analysis of the weaknesses of their client's case.
Such analysis, while likely related to the subject matter of the asserted defense, is
fundamentally different from a similar pre-litigation analysis.
Id.
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (providing that "[flor good cause, the court may order discovery of
any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action."); see also DunhallPharm., 994 F.
Supp. at 1205-06.
24. FED. R.Civ. P. 26(b)(3) (explaining that work product is discoverable "upon a showing that
the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the party's
case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the
materials by other means.").
25. See Mushroom Assocs. v. Monterey Mushrooms, Inc., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1767, 1771 (N.D. Cal.
1992); see also Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 930-31 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
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documents in the attorney's files that constitute work product, but do not
reflect communications with the client, remain protected from discovery.
The leading case advocating a narrow waiver of work product is Thorn
EMI North America, Inc. v. Micron Technology, Inc.26 The Thorn case and

its progeny 27 emphasize that the facts of consequence in determining willful
infringement relate to the infringer's state of mind, and therefore,
"[c]ounsel's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, and legal theories
are not probative of that state of mind unless they have been communicated
to the client".28 In Thorn, the plaintiff requested all documents of
defendant's attorneys in order to explore a number of issues including:
(a) why only one of the four patents was analyzed with respect to validity;
(b) why the opinions were written one year after notice of the alleged
infringement; (c) why a doctrine of equivalents analysis was missing in
some of the opinions; and (d) why counsel did not consult an independent
technical person with respect to the patents. 29 The plaintiff contended that it
needed access to defendant's work product in order to examine the theories
disclosed 30in the legal opinions and to evaluate the competence of those
opinions.
The court in Thorn held that the plaintiff should indeed be entitled to
discover facts related to whether defendant's reliance on the opinions was
reasonable, including: (a) when defendant sought the legal advice; (b) what
defendant knew about the law firm's independence, skill, and competence to
provide the opinions; (c) what defendant knew about the nature and extent of
analysis performed by the firm; and (d) what defendant knew and concluded
about the credibility, value, and reasonableness of the opinions. 3' But the
court, determining that counsel's mental impressions were not probative of
defendant's state of mind unless they had been communicated to the client,
concluded that any information not communicated was not probative of
intent, and was therefore not relevant or discoverable.32

26. 837 F. Supp. 616 (D. Del. 1993).
27. See also Micron Separations, 159 F.R.D. at 363 (stating that work materials not probative
unless communicated to client).
28. Thorn, 837 F. Supp. at 622.
29. Id. at 619.
30. Id.
31. Id.at 621. See also Nitinol Med. Techs. v. AGA Med. Corp., 135 F. Supp. 2d 212, 218 (D.
Mass. 2000). The Court in Nitinol further stated that:
Unless it can be established that the defendant knew of the factual basis for counsel's
opinions, such work product should not have to be produced.., here. The inquiry should
focus on what [defendant] knew about its counsel's 'independence, skill and competence
to provide the opinions, what [defendant] knew about the nature and extent of analysis
performed by the firm, and what [defendant] knew and had concluded about the
credibility, value and reasonableness of the opinion.'
Id.
32. Thorn, 837 F. Supp. at 622-23. Cf Cordis Corp. v. SciMed Life Sys., Inc., 980 F. Supp.
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The decision in Steelcase, Inc. v. Haworth, Inc.33 also required that all
documents underlying the legal opinion be produced, but drew the line at
any evidence concerning whether the opinion was "legally correct." 34 The
court, deciding that such evidence related to the attorney's state of mind and
was thus inadmissible, explained how the waiver of privilege and immunity
in such cases is both broad and narrow:
[T]he privilege must be deemed waived concerning all documents
in the client's hands that refer or relate to counsel's opinion or
represent information relayed to counsel as a basis for the opinion.
Furthermore, the privilege is waived as to all information provided
by the client to the attorney, regarding the subject matter of the
opinion. In this regard, the scope of the waiver is "broad," to the
extent that it is necessary to shed complete light upon the alleged
infringer's state of mind. By the same token, the scope of the
waiver appears narrow, as it pertains to the attorney's state of mind.
Especially irrelevant is discovery addressed to the "legal
correctness" of the opinion.35
The court in Steelcase, noting that the Federal Circuit had not directly
dealt with the scope of the waiver, pointed to other areas in which the court
has made it clear that the relevant issue is the infringer's intent, not the intent
of counsel.36 Whether a legal opinion is legally correct, the court said, is not
the proper issue - only whether the opinion was thorough enough to instill a
reasonable belief in the client that the patent at issue was invalid, not
infringed, or unenforceable.37
IV. THE BROAD WAIVER POSITION
By contrast, other courts have concluded that discovery in advice-ofcounsel cases should include all information considered by counsel when the
1030, 1033 (D. Minn. 1997) (stating that "[a]lthough we agree with the Defendant's reading of
Steelcase and Thorn, we are not persuaded that either decision properly resolves the issue before us.
Rather, we believe the rule expressed by these Courts is both impractical, and fundamentally
unsound.").
33. 954 F. Supp. 1195 (W.D. Mich. 1997).
34. Id. at 1198-99 (citing Graco, Inc. v. Binks Mfg. Co., 60 F.3d 785, 793 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
35. Id. (emphasis in original).
36. Id. at 1199.
37. Id. at 1199-1200. See also Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 944 (Fed. Cir. 1992);
Graco, Inc. v. Binks Mfg. Co., 60 F.3d 785, 793 (Fed. Cir. 1995).

opinion was formulated.38 At its extreme, this would include opinion work
product, which has typically been given greater protection than ordinary
work product.39 Seminal among the decisions advocating a broad waiver is
Mushroom Associates v. Monterey Mushrooms, Inc.,40 where the court

observed that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) 4I work product
is discoverable upon a showing of substantial need and inability without
undue hardship to obtain substantially equivalent materials - two standards,
the court suggested, that are present in most advice-of-counsel cases. 2 The
court concluded that "it is difficult to imagine the circumstances where the
standard for discovering the vast majority of work product will not be met in
an advice of counsel defense case."' 3
The court in Mushroom Associates considered sepaiately the issues of
attorney-client privilege and work-product immunity. In finding waiver of
the attorney-client privilege with respect to all documents pertaining to the
patent, the court noted that a plaintiff needs access to privileged information
underlying the opinion letter because reliance on advice-of-counsel cannot
be analyzed without reference to the circumstances surrounding the issuance
of that advice. 4 Rejecting the defendant's argument that the waiver is
limited to documents pertaining to willful infringement, the court stated that
it would be difficult to distinguish between documents relating to
infringement and those to willful infringement. 45 As regards work product,
the court concluded that principles of fairness with respect to the attorneyclient privilege are just as applicable to work-product immunity. 6 As for
opinion work product, the court held that the plaintiffs need for this
information is compelling and that the "only way" the plaintiff can attack the
defendant's advice-of-counsel defense is to have access to circumstances
and factors surrounding the advice.47
38. See FMT Corp., Inc. v. Nissei ASB Co., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1073, 1075 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (stating
that defendant must produce "all documents relied upon or considered by counsel at the time and in
conjunction with rendering that opinion.").
39. See Micron Separations, 159 F.R.D. at 364; see also Bio-Rad Labs., Inc. v. Pharmacia, Inc.,
130 F.R.D. 116, 122 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
40. 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1767 (N.D. Cal. 1992); see also Hoover Universal, Inc. v. Graham Packaging
Corp., 44 U.S.P.Q.2d 1596, 1598 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Frazier Indus. Co., Inc. v. Advance Storage
Prods., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d 1702, 1703 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
41. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) (providing that work product is discoverable "upon a showing that
the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the party's
case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the
materials by other means.").
42. Mushroom Assocs. v. Monterey Mushrooms, Inc., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1767, 1771 (N.D. Cal.
1992).
43. Id.
44. Id.
at 1770.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1771.
47. Id.See also Beneficial Franchise Co., Inc. v. Bank One, N.A., 205 F.R.D. 212, 218 (N.D. Ill.
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Other courts have adopted this theme, that evidence of the attorney's
mindset can be relevant to determining the client's mindset. In Electro
Scientific Industries, Inc. v. General Scanning, Inc.,48 the court ordered

defendant's attorneys to produce all pre-litigation files to plaintiffs outside
counsel. 49 Electro Scientific acknowledged that its order might harm the
creativity and candor of attorneys who believed their analyses would remain
private, but the court rationalized that any harm would be compensated by
gains in the truth-finding process.5 ° The court also noted that documents of
tactical significance, such as deposition or witness outlines and jury
arguments, would be protected under the court's carefully prescribed order.51
By ordering discovery, the court stated that it wished to avoid a formalistic
distinction between evidence communicated to the client and that which was
not:
Certainly it would not be rational to assume that everything in
counsel's files reached the client, or that counsel communicated to
the client all of what he or she really thought, but it would be
comparably irrational to assume that there could be no relationship

2001). The court in Beneficial Franchisefurther reasoned:
Not all information conveyed to a client is neatly reflected in a transmittal letter or in a
memorandum specifically directed to the client. The practical reality is that if negative
information was important enough to reduce to a memorandum, there is a reasonable
possibility that the information was conveyed in some form or fashion to the client.
Id. at 218.
48. 175 F.R.D. 539 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
49. Id. at 544; see also Mosel Vitelic Corp. v. Micron Techn., Inc., 162 F. Supp. 2d 307, 312 (D.
Del. 2000); Cordis Corp. v. SciMed Life Sys., Inc., 980 F. Supp. 1030, 1033 (D. Minn. 1997).
50. Electra Scientific, 175 F.R.D. at 547. The court explained:
Of course, our system also has an interest in encouraging lawyers to brainstorm,
ruminate, and undertake frank analyses before lawsuits are filed. And my disposition of
this part of plaintiffs motion will harm that interest. How much harm it will do I am not
sure, but, as explained in the next paragraph, the order I am fashioning will limit that
harm except in the probably unusual case where the contribution to the truth finding
process that would be made by permitting litigation use of the work product materials
will visibly outweigh the competing work product interests.
Id.
51. Id. at 546. (noting that the order "will only reach documents that were prepared before the
lawsuit was filed and that relate to the analyses of infringement, validity, and/or enforceability.").
Thus, documents "with more direct tactical sensitivity, like outlines of possible questions for
deponents or trial witnesses, or compilations of materials to be used to support an argument to the
jury, would remain off limits." Id. See also DunhallPharms., 994 F. Supp. at 1205-06 (holding that
there is no waiver of work product protection after filing of lawsuit because there is an "enhanced
interest in protecting against disclosure of trial strategy and planning" and therefore "the balance of
competing interests shifts at the time the lawsuit is filed."); but see Beneficial FranchiseCo., 205
F.R.D. at 217-18.
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between what counsel really thought (as reflected in her private
papers) and what she in fact communicated to her client. In this
important sense, evidence about what was really in the lawyer's
mind could be quite relevant to the issue of what was really in the
client's mind.52
Several courts have noted that a narrow waiver would actually
encourage counsel to place only the most favorable version of the facts and
law in their opinion letters, with the knowledge that unfavorable information
would be protected from discovery.53
54
The decision of DunhallPharmaceuticals,Inc. v. Discus Dental, Inc.,
55
relying on the broad reach of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1),
also required discovery of the work product because it might lead to a better
understanding of the client's mindset:
While negative evidence contained in an attorney's files may not
ultimately reflect upon the client's state of mind, and will therefore
not be admissible as evidence of willfulness, that evidence could
very well lead to the discovery of relevant and admissible evidence
of the client's state of mind that might not otherwise come to light.
If the attorney's files contain evidence contradicting or questioning
the opinion relied on by the client, the plaintiff has a right to know
about such evidence in order to fully question defendants and their
counsel regarding that evidence, disclosure to the client, and other
56
related issues.

52. Electro Scientific, 175 F.R.D. at 545; see also Dunhall Pharm., 994 F. Supp. at 1205 (noting

that evidence in an attorney's file is not always going to reflect whether its contents were
communicated to the client, such as an attorney's notes concerning discussions with a client about
negative opinions).
53.

See Mosel Vitelic, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 312 (stating that "[the holding in Thorn] effectively

encourages patent attorneys to deliberately omit damaging information from their opinion letters in
order to insulate their client from a finding of willful infringement."); see also Cordis, 980 F. Supp.
at 1034, n. I (providing that it is doubtful "that the law would intend, however inadvertently, to
reward incompetence, or willful artifice, by insulating such opinions from searching scrutiny.").
54. 994 F. Supp. 1202 (C.D. Cal. 1998).

55. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (stating that material must appear "reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence"); see also Hoover Universal, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1598.

The

court in Hoover found that discovery was permissible for a broader range of documents than may
ultimately be discoverable at trial. Id. "The internal memoranda and other work product of the law
firms that prepared the opinion letters in this matter could reveal circumstantial evidence of
conflicting or contradictory opinions that were in fact communicated to Graham by counsel." Id.
"Hoover is entitled to discover such circumstantial evidence and to cross-examine Graham and
Graham's counsel about its possible relevance." Id. The Court could not state definitively "that the
only documents clearly communicated to Graham by counsel could ever lead to relevant and
admissible evidence as to Graham's state of mind at the time of the alleged infringement." Id.
56. Dunhall Pharms., 994 F. Supp. at 1205.
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The court in Dunhall Pharmaceuticals took a fairly aggressive
approach, holding that the scope of the waiver extended to the subject matter
of the defense.57 But perhaps the broadest possible view of waiver was
articulated in the recent decision in Novartis PharmaceuticalsCorp. v. Eon
Labs Mfg.,58 where the court shifted emphasis from the state of mind of the
alleged infringer to that of waiver and its absolute consequences:
[T]here is no reason why an accused infringer's waiver of the
attorney-client privilege should not be considered unlimited, and
therefore, apply broadly to any and all materials available to the
attorneys rendering the legal advice. In the Court's view, it is
critical for the patentee to have a full opportunity to probe, not only
the state of mind of the infringer, but also the mind of the lawyer
upon which the infringer so firmly relied. There is no reason why
the alleged infringer's waiver of the attorney-client privilege should
not be considered absolute, encompassing materials typically
protected by the work product doctrine.59
The court continued:
Further the Court believes this approach, in addition to being
consistent with the principles of waiver, supports the policy
considerations of an advice of counsel defense. Specifically, by
focusing on the waiver as the gateway for permissible discovery, the
defense will most likely only be invoked by infringers who
prudently and sincerely sought competent advice from competent
counsel. Moreover, focusing on the infringer's waiver rather than
state of mind may reduce the chances of legal gamesmanship
creeping into the practice of rendering infringement and validity
opinions.60
Other courts, while endorsing the concept of a broad waiver, have
limited discovery to avoid unnecessary invasion of work product. The court,

57. Id. (explaining "that the waiver of work product protection does not involve such
'gatekeeping' by defense counsel" but rather "the waiver extends, and is limited, to the subject
matter of the defense."); see also Electro Scientific, 175 F.R.D. at 546 (extending the order to reach
only documents prepared pre-suit and which are relevant to the analysis of infringement, validity,
and/or enforceability).
58. 206 F.R.D. 396 (D. Del. 2002).
59. Id. at 399.
60. Id.

in an otherwise broad holding in Micron Separations,Inc. v. Pall Corp.,6 1
made it clear that it was restricting the work-product waiver to opinion work
product of trial counsel which was inconsistent with the opinion letter, and
which cast doubt upon the validity of the opinion.62 This limitation, the
court reasoned, would prevent "an unnecessarily broad invasion of trial
counsel's work product., 63 And the court in Cordis Corp. v. SciMed Life
Systems 64 required discovery of work papers of defendant's law firm as they
"relate to the garnering of factual bases for the opinions that are expressed in
the firm's letter opinions to the Defendant., 65 But the court stopped short of
requiring disclosure of any other work product:
[We see no reason to allow] the Plaintiff to peruse the legal
research, and preliminary drafts of the opinion letters, that were
ultimately transmitted to [defendant's attorneys], unless those drafts
were reviewed, and/or edited by the employees or agents of the
Defendant. In our view, the capacity of the Plaintiff to appraise the
competency of [defendant's attorney's] interpretation of the
governing law is not dependent upon any intrusion into [defendant's
attorney's] legal research papers, or intra-firm discussion drafts.
Accordingly, [defendant's attorney] is not required to divulge such
papers, except to the extent that they have been shared with the
Defendant.66
As for work product created after the filing of the lawsuit, most courts
6 7 and have refused
have followed the reasoning
of Dunhall Pharmaceuticals
68
to allow the discovery:
[F]ollowing the filing of the lawsuit, defense counsel is engaged in
critical trial preparation, often including analysis of the weaknesses
of their client's case. Such analysis, which while likely related to
the subject matter of the asserted defense, is fundamentally different
61. 159 F.R.D. 361 (D. Mass. 1995).
62. Id. at 365. In Micron the court stated that:
[s]urely the waiver extends to any documents communicated to MSI by present trial
counsel before suit was filed which contain 'potentially damaging information' and/or
express 'grave reservations' respecting the opinion letter. But I decline to apply the
waiver to documents containing the opinion work product of present trial counsel which
is solely consistent with the opinion letter and does not in any way cast any doubt on the
validity of the opinions expressed or the basis for those opinions.
Id. (emphasis in original).
63. Id.
64. 980 F. Supp. 1030 (D. Minn. 1997).
65. Id. at 1034.
66. Id.
67. 994 F. Supp. 1202 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
68. See also Electro Scientific, 175 F.R.D. at 546.
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from a similar pre-litigation analysis. In comparison to work
product produced prior to the filing of the lawsuit, litigation-related
work product deserves greater protection.69
The court in Dunhall thus held that "[o]nce the lawsuit is filed, the
waiver of work-product protection ends. 70 However, the court in Beneficial
FranchiseCo., Inc. v. Bank One, N.A. 7' disagreed, and allowed discovery of
post-suit work product on the basis of fairness:
The overriding principle is one of fairness. When a party chooses to
inject into the case attorney opinions, fairness is served by allowing
the opposing party to have access to documents casting doubt or
contradicting those opinions - even if prepared by trial counsel after
suit was commenced. Moreover, we believe that that is consistent
with what a party's expectation should be if he or she chooses to
inject attorney advice into the case - a party cannot fairly expect to
offer only the privileged72information which he or she deems helpful,
and to withhold the rest.
The wide disparity in results and in policies espoused by the courts in
the cases discussed above underscores the need for the Federal Circuit to
address in a definitive way this important issue, which can have profound
consequences in the trial of a patent infringement case.
V. SUMMARY

Although the Federal Circuit has not specifically defined the scope of
work-product waiver which results from an advice-of-counsel defense in

willful infringement cases, the Court has made clear that it is the infringer's
intent, not that of counsel, which is the relevant issue. With this principle in
mind, the production of otherwise protected work product must be broad
enough to illuminate the issue, but no broader.

The courts dealing with the waiver question have typically engaged in a
balancing of interests, with a variety of policy implications being articulated
for the results reached. The plaintiffs interest in obtaining all work product
relating to the subject matter of the asserted defense is balanced against
defendant's countervailing interest in protecting traditional opinion work
69.
70.
71.
72.

DunhallPharms., 994 F. Supp at 1206; accordMicron Separations, 159 F.R.D. at 365-66.
DunhallPharms.,994 F. Supp. at 1206.
2001).
205 F.R.D. 212 (N.D. 111.
Id. at 218.
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product. The courts tackling the issue have ranged from the very
circumscribed position that only material communicated to the client is
discoverable, to one where virtually all opinion work product must be
revealed because it might lead to information which ultimately had some
influence on the alleged infringer's state of mind. Neither position is
entirely satisfactory. The overly narrow approach often leads to preclusion
of certain information that is in fact relevant to the alleged infringer's state
of mind, while the overly broad approach reveals work product containing
mental impressions of the attorney, which were never communicated to the
client, and which contain otherwise protected trial strategy.
It is submitted that the best compromise between these two extremes is
an in camera inspection by the court of the work product at issue, in order to
determine whether there is evidence of a position contrary to the written
legal opinion which is relevant to the alleged infringer's state of mind. If so,
such specific evidence can then be brought to the attention of the trier of fact
for its consideration, while the traditional protection afforded opinion work
product is maintained for all other documents in the attorney's files.
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